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On Thursday, the member states of the European Convention of Human Rights will meet in
Copenhagen to adopt a joint declaration on the future of the human rights system in
Europe. The Draft of the Copenhagen Declaration, presented on 5 February 2018 and
sponsored by the current Danish Presidency of the Council of Europe, has met with
considerable alarm on the part of human rights activists and academics. It makes unclear,
ambiguous or inaccurate statements that could represent a serious crisis of the system if
not redefined in the adoption of the final Declaration.
The draft Declaration is one more step in the ongoing process of improving the system,
pursued at a series of conferences in Interlaken (2010), Izmir (2011), Brighton (2012) and
Brussels (2015). These conferences were principally concerned with the compliance of
States to their ECHR obligations. The current Copenhagen conference, however, seems to
focus more on increasing the member states’ control over the Strasbourg Court.
The draft Declaration has been subject of lively debates over the last few weeks by relevant
experts in the field (most of all on Strasbourg Observers and EJIL Talk). And this is
because the text of the draft has generated well-based suspicions among them all. It aims,
at least formally, to reinforce the subsidiary nature of the European guarantee system but
also to bolster the legal status of the State’s margin of appreciation. Both concepts are fully
subsumed in the European guarantee system, in the supervisory role of the ECtHR and in
the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, as well as in the doctrine devoted to their
study. So much so that Protocol No. 15 to the ECHR, which is awaiting ratification in six
member states (including Spain) to enter into force, provides for an additional recital in the
preamble of the ECHR so that both principles are explicitly recognised in the Convention
text as follows:
“Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to
the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this
Convention”.
In any case, the Draft Copenhagen Declaration is in line with the boost given to the
principle of subsidiarity in the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, which had also been the
Leitmotiv of the Brighton Declaration of 2012, and to the principle of the margin of
appreciation, which is somewhat more complex and generates conflicting positions within
the doctrine.
The declaration touches the following topics: (a) shared responsibility: better balance,
improved protection; (b) national compliance: the main role of the States; (c) European
supervision: the subsidiary role of ECtHR; (d) interaction between the national and
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European levels: the need for dialogue and participation; (d) the workload challenge: the
need for further action; (e) interpretation: the need for clarity and coherence; (f) the
selection and election of judges: the importance of cooperation; and (g) the enforcement of
sentences. It also refers to the entry of the European Union and the entry into force of
Protocols No. 15 and 16 to the ECHR, albeit on a residual basis.
This sounds all familiar. But there also appears be have been a change of focus. The draft
declaration seems to call on the ECtHR, and not so much on the States, to modulate their
action. And it is precisely this change of direction that has alerted academia and other
stakeholders in the system (especially NGOs).
I’ll explain myself. There is a strong tension between the function of individual protection of
rights and the constitutional function exercised by the ECtHR. This tension is experienced
by the ECtHR itself in at least two ways: on the one hand, the case overload it has to face
and which it has been trying to overcome with improvements in its internal organisation and
functioning. And, on the other hand, the increasingly evident tendency of the Court to opt
for the establishment of general standards so that States, using their margin of
appreciation, are responsible for applying them in each specific case. In such a context, the
ECtHR must deal with domestic failures to guarantee fundamental rights, sometimes
structural failures, repetitive cases, and the fact that for some individuals the ECtHR is not
a subsidiary guarantee of their rights, but the first and only one. So, the Court must handle
different type of cases and sometimes such reality forces the Court to go the bottom of a
case, calling into question the margin of appreciation highly appreciated by the States. In
practice, moreover, States do not like the ECtHR establishing general principles that define
the scope of domestic rights, because this implies conditioning their sovereign scope.
Basically, in the words of Prof. Janneke Gerards, “although the States thus seem to
embrace the Court’s constitutional role and even appear to want to enhance its function of
standard-setting, apparently they do not like to accept the consequences of this”.
In my opinion, the scope of competence of European Court and its right to adjudicate over
the scope of the ECHR rights, its judicial independence and the authority of its judgments
are at stake.
In the section on shared responsibility, which is undoubtedly one of the foundations of the
European system of rights, the draft Declaration incorporates two particularly shocking
elements. In particular, the definition of subsidiarity adds a hitherto non-existent reference
to the constitutional tradition and the national circumstances of each State. As the ECtHR
points out in its opinion on the draft, these two elements may be taken into account by the
Court when deciding each specific case. However, it is not acceptable that the Court’s
jurisdiction should be limited or conditioned a priori by each of the normative and/or social
peculiarities of each State.
With regard to the enforcement of judgements at the domestic level, there is nothing to
criticize. It would be very positive for the European system if everything set out in the draft
were to be complied with, since it reinforces the idea that compliance with judgments is the
primary obligation of States, and even incorporates a series of measures that should be
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adopted and that were already recommended in Brighton in 2012, relating to the obligation
of States to make their general provisions, administrative practices and case law
compatible with the European standard.
Many more questions arise, however, in the following sections of the Draft Declaration.
With regard to subsidiarity, the criterion developed by the ECtHR in response to the
Declaration of Brighton is taken up: “qualitative and democracy-enhancing approach“. This
term, coined by the current ECtHR Judge Robert Spano, implies that the Court tries to limit
its analysis of the correct protection of conventional rights to verify whether the internal
decision-making processes were sufficiently weighted. However, this does not mean, as the
Court itself claims, that the scope of subsidiarity should be determined by the States in, for
example, a Declaration, but that it is the European Jurisdiction itself that must assess in
each case what role subsidiarity plays. Otherwise, the very role of the ECtHR as a guardian
would be distorted.
The current wording of the paragraphs on the dialogue to be held between States and the
European Court is also alarming. While it the intention to foster the dialogue between the
public authorities and the ECtHR is laudable, the dialogue instruments pointed out may
involve a direct attack on the independence of the Court. Thus, while the Draft is right to
encourage member states, for example, to make more use of third party interventions, it
does not seem appropriate, on the other hand, for States to seek to draw up reports
through a sort of discussion group on human rights and for these to be referred to the
ECtHR for consideration. The dialogue to be maintained by the ECtHR is with the other
judges and courts involved in the European system of rights protection, i.e. the ordinary
courts and constitutional courts of the States parties. But a proposal for direct dialogue
between states, indeed governments, and the Court could call into question its judicial
independence. The current wording of the proposal to allow States to participate in the
request for a case to be re-examined by the Grand Chamber also raises doubts. This
proposal could be of interest to the ECtHR as a kind of third party intervention (given the
nature of the cases that go to the Grand Chamber), provided that it is understood that the
expression used in the draft “to take such support into account when determining whether
the conditions of Article 43 (2) of the Convention have been met” implies exclusively that
the ECtHR will take into account but will not be bound or compelled by them.
In any event, and in line with what was said in its Opinion by the ECtHR, the Draft of the
Copenhagen Declaration needs to be modified before it can be adopted, in order to clarify
that the European Court alone has the power to monitor the fulfilment of the States’
obligations under the ECHR (both from the point of view of the exclusivity of the power of
control and from the point of view of its competences) and that, in order to do so, they must
respect the judicial independence and the legal content of the Convention.
On these premises, a profound reform of the Convention and the Court to improve its
functioning, and increase its effectivity and the quality of its decisions, requires time. And
money: as the ECtHR points out, the member states should make a greater budgetary
effort to improve the situation, a request which had already been expressed in the Brussels
declaration and which is mentioned somewhat superficially in the Copenhagen draft.
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